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This white paper builds a new financial theory of euro area 
sovereign bond markets under stress. The theory explains 
the abnormal bond pricing and increasing spreads during 
the recent market turmoil. We find that the strong discon-
nect of bond spreads from the respective bonds’ underlying 
fundamental values in 2010 was triggered by an increase 
in asymmetric information and weak reputation of govern-
ment policies. Both factors cause a normal bond market to 
switch into a crisis mode. Finally, those markets are prone 
to self-fulfilling bubbles in which the economic effects are 
amplified by herding behaviour arising from animal spirits. 
Altogether, this produces contagious effects and multiple 
equilibria. Thus, we argue that government bond markets 
in a monetary union are more fragile and vulnerable to 
liquidity and solvency crises. Consequently, the systemic 
mispricing of sovereign debt creates more macroeconomic 
instability and bubbles in the euro area than in a single 
country. In other words, financial markets are partly blind 
to national default risks in a currency union. Therefore, the 
current European institutional framework puts the wrong 
incentives in place and needs structural changes soon. To 
tackle the root causes we suggest more market incentives 
via consistent rules, pre-emptive austerity measures in 
good economic times, and a resolution scheme for heavily 
indebted countries. In summary, our paper enhances the 
bond market theory and provides new insights into the 
recent bond market turmoil in Europe.
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The European sovereign debt crisis poses serious questions for 
financial theory in general and bond market pricing in particu-
lar. According to standard theory, bond yields reflect default 
risk, and default risk is determined by a number of funda-
mental variables, such as government debt-to-GDP ratios and 
the current account balance. The theory states that a higher 
government debt-to-GDP ratio increases the burden of debt 
service and thus increases the probability of default. Hence, 
bond spreads widen because investors demand a higher risk 
premium to compensate for the default risk in comparison to 
an alternative bond. A similar effect occurs for a large current 
account deficit because it can be interpreted as an increase in 
net foreign debt. As a matter of fact, an increase in net foreign 
debt affects the default risk of both the private and govern-
ment sectors.
Since the beginning of the euro crisis in 2010, spreads of 
government bonds have widened considerably. However, 
the increase in spreads has been significantly larger than the 
changes in the underlying fundamentals (De Grauwe and Ji 
2012). This raises the question of whether the financial mar-
kets may have just mispriced risks or orthodox bond theory 
is not applicable to a monetary union. The obvious discon-
nect between the spread and fundamental value is proven 
for the GIPS states, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. 
For these countries, financial markets exerted no disciplinary 
effect on high debt-to-GDP ratios from 1999 to 2010, before 
the onset of the crisis. This demonstrates the flawed incentives 
in the European Monetary Union (EMU). It remains a conun-
drum why bond markets suddenly changed that mindset in 
2010. This white paper sheds light on this issue.
Indeed, euro area member states do not have control over 
their own currency and thus, in contrast to stand-alone coun-
tries, they cannot guarantee pay-out to bondholders. Thus, it is 
not remarkable that stand-alone countries with debt-to-GDP 
ratios equally high or even higher than the indebted Euro-
pean member states were not affected by a similar debt crisis. 
This may be evidence that mispricing of sovereign risk is aug-
mented in a currency union. Consequently, government bond 
markets are more fragile and vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises. 
Such self-fulfilling crises produce multiple equilibria includ-
ing a bad, or a kind of trap, equilibrium. The policy lesson is 
simple: A monetary union only works efficiently if its institu-
tional rules and setup are based on market incentives for fiscal 
and economic policies. The rules have to imitate the market 
forces of a stand-alone country. Of course, in case of turmoil, 
austerity measures and temporary liquidity provisions are 
reasonable instruments to tackle the problem. However, addi-
tional liquidity measures from the central bank alone are insuf-
ficient because monetary policy is considerably constrained in 
the EMU. Moreover, monetary policy does not tackle the root 
cause of a sovereign debt crisis, in particular the loss of com-
petitiveness and thus the underlying current account imbal-
ances in the eurozone.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 
2 is a brief introduction to the bond market supply-and-
demand model in normal times. In Section 3 we explain the 
unique characteristics of the European sovereign bond mar-
ket and develop a new bond pricing theory. We explain our 
conceptual model and discuss the new determinants in detail: 
economic fundamentals, asymmetric information, reputation 
issues, and animal spirits. The new theory provides a straight-
forward explanation of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro 
area. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
Global Financial Institute
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The bond market is the heart of financial economics. Usually 
we differentiate between corporate and sovereign bonds. This 
white paper provides an in-depth study of sovereign bonds 
because of the recent anomalies during the euro crisis (Herzog 
2012). The paper focuses mainly on sovereign bonds under 
stress and offers new insights into and explanations for bond 
market dynamics.
First consider the bond market in normal times, when the 
standard supply-and-demand determinants apply. In asset-
pricing theory there are at least four factors that determine 
the demand for assets:
I. The wealth level, which is the total resource/income 
owned by an individual;
II. The expected return, which is defined over the next 
period;
III. The risk, which measures the degree of uncertainty;
IV. The liquidity, which expresses the speed with which the 
asset can be transformed into cash.
All four determinants – wealth, expected return, risk, and 
liquidity – are evaluated for a given bond relative to an alter-
native asset. The impact that a change in these determinants 
has on bond supply and demand is obvious (Table 1).
Holding everything else constant, an increase in wealth or 
liquidity raises the quantity demanded for a bond. Hence, 
higher wealth/income implies more resources available to 
purchase bonds. Liquid markets, characterized by many buy-
ers and sellers, will cause transaction costs to decrease, which 
increases the demand for those assets in relation to others. 
However, an increase in the expected interest rate due to 
higher risk lowers the expected return for bonds; thus, inves-
tors are less attracted to purchase. The risk measure and its 
relationship to the quantity demanded depend on the behav-
iour or attitude of agents. In standard economics we suppose 
that agents are risk-averse.1 Consequently, the higher the 
degree of risk or uncertainty relative to an alternative, the 
lower the quantity demanded, assuming that everything else 
is held constant (especially the expected return).
Similarly, there are three factors that determine the supplied 
quantity of a bond: 
I. The sustainability of public finances, or the public deficit 
and debt levels; 
II. The level of expected inflation; 
III. The expected potential growth rate. 
Each of these factors changes the position of the supply 
curve (Table 1). A higher public deficit or debt increases the 
Global Financial Institute
Table 1: Standard Factors of Bond Demand & Supply
Demand Factors Supply Factors 
An Increase in Caused Effect 
on Bond Demand 
An Increase in Caused Effect 
on Bond Supply 
Wealth Rise Sustainability of public finance 
(lower defict and debt) 
Fall 
Expected interest rate Fall Expected inflation rate Rise 
Expected inflation rate Fall Expected growth rate Rise 
Riskiness of bond Fall     
Liqudity of bond Rise     
Authors’ source.
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supply of sovereign bonds and shifts the supply curve to the 
right. Indeed, the government has to issue treasury bonds to 
finance a higher government deficit. When the deficit is large, 
the government sells more bonds and the quantity supplied 
at each bond price increases. In contrast, a decreasing deficit 
shifts the supply curve in the other direction, as do sounder 
public finances. Similarly, an increase in expected inflation 
reduces the real return (real interest rate), and thus the cost of 
borrowing falls. The lower the cost of borrowing due to higher 
expected inflation, the more a government borrows and the 
higher the quantity supplied. Of course, this channel relies on 
monetary policy, too. Finally, the higher the expected output 
growth, the more eager a government will be to borrow in 
order to finance infrastructure investments. In other words, 
the government will issue more bonds, which will shift the 
supply curve to the right. 
These determinants of supply and demand contribute to the 
standard bond market equilibrium illustrated in Figure 1. On 
the vertical axis we have the interest rate, which is equal to the 
inverse price of a bond. This is due to the fact that at maturity 
the bond has a face value of PF = 100, and the price of the bond 
one year before maturity implicitly defines its one-year inter-
est rate (for instance, a price of PB = 95 implies an interest rate 
of 5.3%). This fact demonstrates that the lower the price before 
maturity, the higher the respective interest rate. Hence, there 
is a negative relationship between the price and the interest 
rate in bond markets.
Figure 1 depicts the concept of equilibrium price and quantity, 
indicating where the market is heading – obviously the mar-
ket always converges towards the equilibrium, E. Figure 1 is 
a conventional supply and demand diagram in normal times. 
In times of market turmoil or crisis it might look different. We 
address this issue in the next section. First, we study the spe-
cific bond market environment in the EMU. Next, we elucidate 
the unique supply and demand constellation of sovereign 
bond markets during market turmoil. Finally, we discuss the 
implications of bond market turmoil and its new equilibrium.
Global Financial Institute
Figure 1: Standard Equilibrium in the Bond Market
Authors’ source.
3. Turmoil in European sovereign bond markets: What’s 
going on?
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This section is devoted to analysing the European sovereign 
bond market under stress. We focus on bond market dynam-
ics in troubled countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, and 
Italy, and compare them with unaffected countries inside and 
outside the euro area such as Germany, Finland, Austria, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan.
European sovereign bond markets are unique due to country-
specific characteristics and the supranational framework of 
the EMU. As a matter of fact, every euro area country still has 
its own bond market based on the sovereignty of national fis-
cal policy. Thus, bond pricing is primarily based on domestic 
fundamentals such as public deficit, debt, current account 
balance, and growth prospects. However, the institutional 
linkage to the supranational framework, especially monetary 
policy, eliminates several important market incentives. The 
European Central Bank (ECB) sets a common interest rate for 
all 17 euro area countries and thus triggers either positive or 
negative stimulus depending on the domestic stage of the 
business cycle. As opposed to the national central banks, the 
supranational ECB is the only institution able to guarantee 
the payout of euro debt obligations. This unique interplay 
between national fiscal policy and supranational monetary 
policy characterises the EMU and the sovereign bond mar-
kets in Europe. In times of market stress, the divide between 
domestic fiscal policy and European monetary policy is an 
important vulnerability.
A comparison to highly indebted G7 member states such as 
Japan, the UK, and the US reveals that euro area countries are 
less flexible and more exposed to sudden market reversals. On 
average, despite high debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP levels, 
individual euro area countries cannot shape possible bond 
buying programs or implement public support for a country 
because of prohibition in European law. In fact, Article 123 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohib-
its monetary financing, while Article 125 (the so-called “no-
bailout clause”) prohibits any support for or bailout of other 
countries. This challenge does not exist in Japan, the US, or the 
UK. In addition, the US benefits from the unique safe haven 
status of the US dollar.
Consequently, the EMU has fundamentally changed the 
institutional setup of national and European governance. All 
member states’ debt is denominated in euros without the 
possibility of a respective central bank to create the means to 
repay the debt. Of course, the EMU member states suppose 
that the contagiousness of a sovereign default is eliminated by 
institutional rules, such as the no-bailout clause or the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) (Herzog, 2012, 2013a). In theory, these 
rules force countries to adopt sound fiscal policies. However, in 
the 1990s economists realized that the no-bailout clause and 
the SGP are ineffective mechanisms that lack credibility, espe-
cially in times of crisis. It was always expected that the rules 
would be abandoned in situations of severe turmoil. Accord-
ing to Hellwig (2011), the implosion of the EMU’s institutional 
setup was only a matter of time. The existing shortcomings 
of European governance have been discussed continuously 
(Fisher et al., 2006; Herzog, 2013b).
Since the tipping point in 2010, financial markets have reas-
sessed the creditworthiness of euro area countries (Herzog, 
2012). The relatively abrupt reversal of sovereign yields has 
produced a situation similar to a bank run, but in the sover-
eign bond market. Bond spreads have increased considerably 
and caused unprecedented turmoil in indebted euro area 
countries. These self-reinforcing effects are highly contagious, 
creating temporary liquidity problems and evolving into an 
enduring solvency crisis. To understand this particular tipping 
point, we establish a new theory of sovereign bond markets 
in turmoil.
3.1. Conceptual Model Framework
It is obvious that the fundamentals, such as the long-term sus-
tainability of public finances, the current account balance, and 
economic growth rates, are insufficient ingredients to explain 
the euro crisis and bond market turmoil in general. In terms 
of the fundamentals alone, it is difficult to understand why 
the market reaction was negligible in countries with similar or 
even higher deficit and debt levels, such as the US, the UK, and 
Japan. Comparing the US, the UK, and Japan to the indebted 
countries in the euro area, we see that fundamentals alone do 
not explain the sudden reassessment of markets. Therefore, 
we have to take into account further vulnerabilities that trig-
ger significant bond market reversals. We propose that the fol-
lowing three issues characterise these additional vulnerabili-
ties and triggers:
I. High Levels of Asymmetric Information: Countries 
with weak fundamentals and whose governance and 
Global Financial Institute
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accounting systems lack transparency and credibility 
generate high levels of asymmetric information that may 
trigger market concerns and subsequently market tur-
moil. The economic mechanism is as follows: an increase 
in asymmetric information increases the transaction cost 
and reduces the liquidity effect. Consequently, the bond 
price drops and the yields rise considerably.
II. Weak Political Reputation: Although the degree of 
asymmetric information, together with the fundamentals, 
is decisive in determining reputation, it does not suffi-
ciently explain the sudden market reversals in some euro 
area countries. The second relevant trigger in bond mar-
kets is the degree of political reputation. A country that 
expresses sufficient willingness to undertake structural 
reforms, such as those designed to regain competitiveness 
or fiscal sustainability, has a stronger reputation. Hence, 
strong reputation helps to diminish market concerns 
about the respective sovereign bond. However, bad fun-
damentals, together with no political commitment, lead 
to weak reputation and self-reinforcing downward spirals. 
As long as policymakers show no willingness to undertake 
necessary changes, countries will lose their reputation. 
The loss of reputation is swift and triggers a tipping point 
in the bond market.
III. Animal Spirit: Last but not least, both mechanisms gen-
erate a vicious circle due to animal spirit. In other words, 
markets follow trends and new trends are vulnerable to 
herding behaviour and market exaggerations.
The interplay among these three factors explains the extreme 
yield dynamic during market turmoil in Europe. Of course, the 
assessment of fundamentals precedes the three triggers. We 
will demonstrate that this constellation even leads to multiple 
equilibria. Figure 2 is a graphical illustration of the conceptual 
model. This model helps to distinguish stable from unstable 
bond market conditions.
The following subsections provide an economic discussion 
about the different elements and their impact on the bond 
market equilibrium during market turmoil.
3.2. Economic Analysis of Fundamentals
The major fundamentals in sovereign bond markets are the: 
i) sustainability of public finances; ii) current account balance; 
iii) expected GDP growth rate; and iv) stability of financial 
Global Financial Institute
Figure 2: Model Framework
I. High Asymmetric Information 
Decline in bond market liquidity due to bad 
fundamentals and singular event 
II. Weak Political Reputation 
Increase in bond riskiness due to unwillingness 
of policymakers to undertake structural reforms 
Bond market turmoil and multiple equilibria 
Examples: 
Japan, US, UK, and GIPS 
Example: 
Ireland 
Examples: 
Italy, 
Portugal 
III. Animal Spirit 
Vicious circle due to herding behaviour 
Example: 
Greece, Spain 
Fundamentals 
Public Deficit and Debt, Current Account Balance, Growth Prospects, Stability of Banking Sector 
Own source.
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markets, i.e., size and linkage of the government and banking 
sector. All four elements have typical measures, and they must 
be assessed for each country.
There is no doubt that apart from the current account balance, 
the sustainability of public finances is the key prerequisite for 
solid bond market conditions. There are many examples that 
show the importance of this element. Bad fundamentals in 
public finances triggered the recent crisis in Europe, as well 
as the crisis in Argentina two decades ago. The economic 
approach to assessing sound public finances utilises the gov-
ernment budget constraint (Herzog 2010):
 (1)
where ∆bt expresses the change in the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio and dbt is the deficit-debt adjustment-to-GDP ratio, 
which includes transactions that affect the outstanding stock 
of debt but not the primary balance. A stable or declining debt 
ratio (i.e. ∆bt≤0) requires a sufficiently large primary surplus, 
pt, and small deficit-debt adjustment, dbt, if the nominal inter-
est rate on outstanding debt is higher than the nominal GDP 
growth rate. According to Bohn (1995), this approach defines 
debt sustainability in general.
The government debt level is sustainable if the government 
is able to generate primary surpluses in the future, which are 
large enough to accommodate the cost of servicing current 
and future debt obligations. Thus, the most effective test of 
sustainability is a positive relationship of primary surpluses 
to the debt-to-GDP ratio, after controlling for government 
spending and the business cycle. Table 2 demonstrates the 
estimated results for Germany and the United States in 2012. 
We find that German public finances are sustainable with a 
Global Financial Institute
Table 2: Estimation of Debt Sustainability in Germany and the United States, 1980 – 2010 (US)
Variable Germany US 
Constant  -3.7505*  0.0509*** 
   (1.9409)  (0.0151) 
Debt-to-GDP  0.0610**  -0.0017*** 
   (0.0265)  (0.0002) 
GVAR  -1.3354***  -0.01433** 
   (0.0793)  (0.0049) 
YVAR  -22.4822***  -0.0530 
   (4.2545)  (0.2181) 
Adj. R-squared 0.8921 0.9298 
F-statistic 42.3587 71.6486 
Dependent: primary deficit. Regression, Newy-West t-values controlled for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. Std. errors in parentheses and * / ** / *** indicate statistical significance at 
10% / 5% / 1% level. Source: Own estimation. 
Herzog (2012).
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positive debt-to-GDP coefficient of 0.061 (significant at the 
5% level). On the contrary, public finances in the United States 
are unsustainable with a negative debt-to-GDP coefficient of 
-0.001 (significant at the 1% level). However, US public finances 
benefit from their exceptional status in financial markets due 
to America’s safe haven currency. In general, we argue that this 
approach is very helpful for informed investors in evaluating 
the sustainability of public debt (Herzog, 2012).
The positive response of primary surplus to the debt-to-GDP 
ratio can be understood intuitively. A necessary and sufficient 
condition for unsustainable debt is the following empirical 
relationship: High primary deficits (greater negative number) 
trigger higher debt accumulation (greater positive number), 
a negative relationship. The primary deficit becomes more 
negative while the debt level becomes more positive. Thus, 
a negative relationship indicates unsustainable public debt 
levels. On the contrary, sustainable finances require a positive 
relationship in which the higher the debt is, the lower is the 
primary deficit (or the higher is the primary surplus).
Apart from the assessment of public finances, it is important to 
consider other macroeconomic variables, such as the current 
account balance, the GDP, and the stability and shape of the 
banking sector. All these factors can be evaluated based on 
independent assessments by central banks, the IMF, or OECD. 
Altogether the analyses of the macroeconomic and financial 
fundamentals provide good information about the state of 
sovereign bonds. Unfortunately this assessment is not suffi-
cient to identify countries exposed to sudden crises or market 
reversals. The US, UK, and Japan are three examples of excep-
tions. Despite bad fundamentals, none of these countries 
displays any bond market turmoil – at least so far. Thus, high 
debt-to-GDP levels, current account deficits, or systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs) are key vulnerabilities 
but they do not trigger a sovereign debt crisis. Consequently, 
bad fundamentals alone do not cause surprising market rever-
sals. Why not?
The US, UK, and Japan do not face the same problematic situ-
ation that the EMU does, in which fiscal policy is a national 
responsibility and monetary policy is a supranational one. 
Of course, this difference does not explain why some euro 
area countries are more exposed than others. To answer that 
question, we have to consider the scale and scope of two key 
distinguishing and decisive elements: asymmetric information 
and reputation.
3.3. Economic Analysis of Asymmetric Information and 
Reputation
Both an increase in asymmetric information and a decrease in 
reputation have a substantial effect on the bond market envi-
ronment. These two factors are able to trigger a sudden crisis 
that leads to a race to the bottom due to herding behaviour. 
Weak reputation and high levels of information asymmetry 
impair the liquidity and increase the riskiness of bonds, affect-
ing assessments of the bonds’ quality. In other words, during 
bond market turmoil we observe that a price decline lowers 
the demand for bonds. This is contrary to normal markets, 
where demand for bonds increases with lower prices. Conse-
quently, in a crisis the bond demand curve becomes upward-
sloping. The phenomenon of an upward-sloping demand 
curve is not uncommon. In 2001, Akerlof, Spence, and Sti-
glitz received the Nobel Prize in Economics for the discovery 
of markets with asymmetric information. They analysed the 
impact of asymmetric information on special demand curves 
as well as the equilibrium price. We apply this idea to bond 
markets in turmoil.
During the sovereign debt crisis, bond yields of countries such 
as Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal increased dramatically, 
despite other countries having similar or even worse funda-
mentals. We argue that asymmetric information and reputa-
tion problems are responsible for these sudden and intense 
reversals.
Suppose there are four types of sovereign bonds: Bonds from 
countries with sound or unsound fundamentals and commit-
ted or uncommitted policymakers. Despite the differences 
that may exist between policymakers, bond investors buy 
without knowing whether the country is sufficiently sustain-
able to repay all debt obligations in future. Hence, they do 
not know the real political commitment to structural reforms 
or budget consolidation. Thus, the overall quality of the 
bond is unknown and it depends on the beliefs of others (in 
some sense, the animal spirit). Of course, even after holding 
the bond, information asymmetry remains because politi-
cal administrations may change, casting doubt on the future 
policy program. Furthermore, investors cannot know whether 
Global Financial Institute
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policymakers are real reformers or not. Consequently, the 
bonds of countries with similarly sound fundamentals will 
sell at the same price, regardless of their proclaimed commit-
ment to reform. However, countries with good reputations 
are unwilling to accept the same risk premium as offered to 
non-reform-oriented countries. Thus, the supply of good qual-
ity bonds declines. Even more importantly, investors are more 
attracted to the high yields because they do not know the 
type of policymakers, but they do know that both countries 
are financially sound today (or, at least, in line with EMU rules).
In sum, the bonds from unsound countries sell at the same 
price whether policymakers are reformers or not. But reform-
oriented countries are not willing to issue bonds at prices that 
are too low or at interest rates that are too high. In the end, 
countries with a credible commitment to reform may exit the 
market. Either way, they may be willing to consolidate the bud-
get autonomously and balance the budget with less external 
finances. However, policymakers without a commitment to 
reform remain in the market. Of course, they are in a strong 
position to finance public expenditures at relatively low rates. 
As a result, there are more bonds with bad quality than good 
quality in the market.
There is anecdotal evidence that the quality of financial assets 
(bonds) is determined by asymmetric information and politi-
cal reputation in the eurozone. We design a new index that 
enables us to measure this new dimension. We argue that a 
country has high levels of asymmetric information and a weak 
reputation if the whole political system is more unstable. An 
unstable political system is characterized by a large number of 
political parties (coalitions), more frequent elections, and high 
corruption. These measures will be used to identify countries 
that are exposed to asymmetric information and reputation 
issues. In Table 3, we compute the new ‘Political Risk Index’ 
(PRI)2  for sovereign bond markets. This PRI is able to address 
both factors sufficiently.
Global Financial Institute
Countries 
Number of 
Nationwide 
Parties 
Number of 
Elections in 
past 20 years 
Human 
Development 
Index (2011) 
Corruption 
Index 
(2012) 
PRI (measurement of 
asymmetric information & 
reputation effects)* 
Canada 7 7 0.908 84 1.7 
Finland 8 6 0.882 90 1.1 
France 23 5 0.884 71 2.8 
Germany 6 6 0.905 79 2.1 
Greece 10 9 0.861 36 6.0 
Ireland 11 5 0.908 69 3.0 
Italy 6 8 0.874 42 5.5 
Portugal 19 7 0.809 63 3.6 
Spain 16 6 0.878 65 3.4 
Switzerland 17 6 0.903 86 1.5 
UK 3 5 0.863 74 2.6 
US 5 6 0.910 73 2.7 
* On a scale from 1.0 (low risk) to 6.0 (high risk). Index of 4 and higher indicates extremely high risk. 
Such countries are regularly exposed to bond market crises. 
Table 3: Political Risk Index (PRI) for Selected Countries
Own calculation.
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So far we argue that unsound countries with uncommitted 
policymakers remain in the market, and even dominate the 
supply, in relation to other types of countries and policymak-
ers. But in extreme events, it may happen that no market equi-
librium for unsound countries exists at all. Suppose the bond 
demand under market stress depends on two variables: the 
price p and the average quality z, where BD = D(p,z(p)). In addi-
tion, the quality is an increasing function of the price. To put 
it simply, the higher the price is, the higher is the quality of 
the asset. Furthermore, the supply S depends on the price p 
and quality z, as well, such that BS = S(p,z(p)). As long as the 
price falls, the quality declines. Within this model it is possible 
to show that under special assumptions, no equilibrium exists 
(Appendix A). Even more surprisingly, we can show that the 
likelihood of more than one equilibrium increases when asym-
metric information aligns with animal spirits.
In summary, under asymmetric information, where quality is 
positively related to price, the demand curve slopes upward, 
as illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 3. If the upward 
sloping demand curve has a steeper or smaller slope than the 
supply curve, an equilibrium of market turmoil, EAI, exists at the 
intersection of the bond supply curve (solid curve) and bond 
demand curve (dotted curve). But there is a second equilib-
rium EF, at the intersection of the downward-sloping demand 
curve with bad fundamentals and the upward-sloping supply 
curve. The difference between the equilibria is that the equi-
librium EF captures only markets with bad fundamentals but 
a credible policymaking environment, while the equilibrium 
EAI reflects both bad fundamentals and an absence of decisive 
commitment to reform. Hence, there is a further exogenous 
event (shock) that questions the fundamentals according to 
our conceptual model (Figure 3).
The bond market with just bad fundamentals still behaves 
like a normal bond market. The respective demand curve (BDF) 
shifts to the left as indicated by the determinants in Table 1. 
However, if an additional event or shock occurs that further 
calls into question the fundamentals because of a lack of repu-
tation or commitment, the demand schedule changes to the 
Global Financial Institute
Figure 3: Bond Market In Turmoil
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upward-sloping (dotted) line. Thus, this simple model displays 
both effects, a bond market with and without market turmoil. 
The two triggers for the market reversal are asymmetric infor-
mation and reputation. Both factors change the slope of the 
demand curve, and probably affect the determinants that shift 
the new upward-sloping demand curve (BDAI). Table 4 sum-
marises the determinants of the bond demand curve during 
market turmoil. As a consequence, Table 4 helps to make sense 
of the behaviour of bond markets in turmoil.
In general, there are two solutions for a market with asym-
metric information and reputation problems: signalling and/
or screening. Both approaches counteract the effects of qual-
ity and uncertainty. One obvious institution is a guarantee 
(good signal). That means governments guarantee that they 
always repay their debt. This is implicitly the case in Europe 
today – via the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and outright monetary 
transactions (OMTs) by the central bank. A second approach is 
better screening, relying on increased  transparency of public 
finances, policy reforms, and sustainability. In this case, policy-
makers credibly commit to undertake the needed reforms or 
budget consolidation. In principle, there are two possibilities 
for how to achieve credible commitments: (1) an automatic 
budget rule (for instance, a debt brake) or (2) an independent 
committee that is responsible for the consolidation process 
(for instance, the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council). Thus, the pre-
requisite for a signalling or screening solution is the absolute 
credibility of either the signal or the action. This can only be 
achieved via effective rules with automatic enforcement or an 
independent authority. The last mechanism was tried in Italy 
via the ‘technocratic’ government led by Mario Monti. 
Since the onset of the euro crisis, there have been several insti-
tutional changes on the European level to improve the signal-
ling and screening solution in future. There was a reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in 2011 and an agreement on the 
fiscal compact in 2012. Both will enhance the signalling and 
screening mechanisms and finally reduce asymmetric infor-
mation and increase fiscal reputation. Of course, all this miti-
gates – but does not solve – the asymmetric information and 
reputation problems in Europe. We do need far deeper institu-
tional and governance reforms in Europe. These reforms have 
to tackle the macroeconomic root cause behind the crisis: the 
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Table 4: Factors of Bond Demand in Normal Markets and Under Stress
Determinants that Shift the Demand Curve 
Market Stress (Upward Sloping Curve) Normal Markets (Downward Sloping Curve) 
An Increase in Shifts Demand 
Curve to the 
An Increase in Shifts Demand Curve 
to the 
Deficit and Debt level 
(weaker fundamentals) 
left and up Deficit and Debt level 
(weaker fundamentals) 
left and down 
Expected inflation rate left and up Expected inflation rate left and down 
Riskiness of bond left and up Riskiness of bond left and down 
Own source.
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poor competitiveness of some countries.
3.4. Construction of the Demand Curve in Market Turmoil
The following subsection provides additional information 
behind the two different demand curves. Readers just inter-
ested in the bottom line of the white paper can omit this 
subsection.
Here, we describe and derive the upward-sloping demand 
curve under market stress and provide an intuitive insight into 
our model. This section is written for financial practitioners 
who are interested in a more rigorous understanding of the 
model. We provide the hidden issues behind the uncommon 
demand schedule but avoid technical details.
We assume that the level of the sovereign yields is character-
ised by economic and financial fundamentals in the respective 
country. Higher bond yields indicate higher risk, i.e., lower 
growth prospects, higher deficits, or higher debts. Alto-
gether, a higher yield describes a less sound situation. How-
ever, higher risk, and correspondingly higher return, is only 
positively linked as long as the country is solvent and able to 
repay its debt obligations in future. As soon as the high risk 
increases, the default probability increases, too. Thus, there is 
a certain point at which the default probability is so high that 
the higher interest rate is unable to compensate for the pro-
spective default. At that point, bond demand declines despite 
high yields, i.e., a high rate of return. Figure 4 illustrates this 
graphically.
The region below the tipping point in Figure 4 depicts the 
normal market situation. Above the tipping point we have 
the bond market in turmoil. This market environment reflects 
a “liquidity aversion” in which bond supply is greater than 
demand and bond yields are extremely high. In normal 
Global Financial Institute
Figure 4: Bond Demand Relation in Different Market Environments
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markets, the investor is in search of yields and purchases 
bonds that are almost safe assets (low default probability) but 
offer a relatively high rate of return. Points close but below 
the tipping point describe such a state. As an unforeseen 
event occurs or the policymakers lose credibility and reputa-
tion, these countries jump to the top segment of the demand 
schedule (tipping point in Figure 4). This implies that despite 
higher yields, the demand of assets is equal or lower. Thus, we 
have a demand shortage or, in terms of the sovereign bond 
market, a “liquidity aversion.” In this market environment 
investors merely search for safety. This effect is similar to the 
idea of asymmetric information in financial markets (cf. Stiglitz 
and Dasgupta 1971; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
If we agree on this relationship, it is quite simple to derive the 
demand curve in normal markets as well as in markets under 
turmoil. The demand curve in the normal market is character-
ised by the upward-sloping segment and the demand curve 
under stress is characterised by the downward-sloping part in 
Figure 4. Although this is an intuitive argument, it does not 
take the pricing signal into account. Therefore, we will assume 
that in all market environments a higher price always indicates 
higher quality – and vice versa. It remains to be shown that 
the demand curve is downward-sloping in a normal market 
and upward-sloping in bond markets under stress. We illus-
trate this feature in Figure 5. Here, we construct the respective 
demand curves within the 4-quadrant system.
The first quadrant on the top-right side illustrates the two 
constructed demand curves. The downward-sloping curve 
depicts bond demand in normal markets. The upward-sloping 
curve demonstrates the bond demand under market turmoil. 
In the second quadrant on the top-left we have a 45°-line that 
is needed for construction purposes only. The third quadrant 
on the bottom-left illustrates the assumed positive relation 
between the price and quality. The most important feature 
is depicted in the fourth quadrant on the bottom-right side. 
Here we have the essential ingredients for the construction 
process of the two different demand curves. The dotted curve 
depicts the situation of the bond market under stress. This 
situation is characterised by the search for safety (Figures 4). 
Thus, during market turmoil the demand for bonds increases 
with higher quality. Indeed, this pattern – the flight to safety in 
assets such as German Bunds – has appeared in the European 
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sovereign debt crisis. Given this relationship, one can see how 
the upward-sloping dotted demand curve (through points 
A and B) results by construction. The solid curve, however, 
depicts the situation of normal markets. In normal markets, 
investors have confidence and they are in search of returns. 
Hence, there is high demand for assets with a high rate of 
return and lower quality. This linkage results in the common 
downward-sloping demand curve (through points X and Y). 
It is noteworthy that both lines in the bottom-right quadrant 
follow immediately from the intuitive idea in Figure 4. The 
upward-sloping line reflects the normal market and the down-
ward-sloping line the market turmoil. The graphical construc-
tion of the demand curve is convincing and intuitive.
3.5. The Role of Animal Spirit
The final force in our conceptual model is animal spirit – in 
other words, the herding behaviour of investors. Suppose 
we have a bond market with bad fundamentals and, in addi-
tion, an asymmetric information and/or reputation problem. 
Consequently, the bond market switches from normal into 
crisis mode. Commonly, a country in market turmoil displays 
high volatility in bond prices and interest rates due to a dif-
ferent assessment of the quality of the assets. In such a situa-
tion some investors lose confidence in the underlying assets, 
which reduces prices; others are more reluctant to reassess 
the fundamentals. Thus, the pricing effects are asymmetric 
and amplified either positively or negatively, due to herding 
behaviour. According to the literature on behavioural macro-
economics by De Grauwe (2012), we call this “animal spirit.”
Next we build a model and demonstrate its impact with a sim-
ple numerical simulation. Suppose there are two types of trad-
ers, optimists and pessimists. Optimists systematically over-
estimate and pessimists underestimate the bond price and 
quality respectively.  Thus, the market price, bt, that reflects the 
bond quality as well is different in both groups. The optimists 
believe that bopt = b*+x, and the pessimists believe bpes = b*- x, 
where x > 0 and b* is the true, but unobserved, fundamental 
value. The bond demand functions are
(1a, 1b)
where a>0. Assume that a market-maker collects the individual 
orders of the two types of traders wi,t, where i is the type of 
trader (either 1 = optimist or 2 = pessimist) and t is the time. 
The market value of the bond price is computed by the follow-
ing forward equation
 (2)
where γ>0 measures the speed with which the market-maker 
adjusts the bond value. Moreover, by defining zt:=w(opt,t)-w(pes,t), 
with ∑iw(i,t) =1 we are able to rewrite the weights with simple 
algebra, such that  w(opt,t)=(1+zt)/2 and w(pes,t)=(1-zt)/2. After 
substituting these definitions and the equations (1a, 1b) into 
equation (2), we obtain the equation
(3)
This equation has an intuitive interpretation. The change 
of the bond price between two time periods is determined 
by two factors: (1) the gap between the fundamental value 
and today’s value, (b*-bt), and (2) the fraction of pessimists 
and optimists, zt. The bond price tomorrow, b(t+1), increases 
(decreases) if its fundamental value b* is above (below) the 
bond price  bt today.  Moreover, it increases if zt>0, i.e. the 
number of optimists is greater than the number of pessimists, 
and vice versa for zt<0. In addition, the impact on the future 
bond price is dependent on the size and difference in price 
expectations x. Under the assumption of rational expectations 
(RE), pricing equation (3) simplifies to the typical benchmark 
equation of bond markets: bt =b*; in which the bond price in 
period t equals the fundamental value.
Lastly, we use the same assumption to describe the dynam-
ics of traders. Traders do not choose their trading strategy 
randomly, but rather on the basis of rational and evolution-
ary criteria. Traders utilise a certain rule and if it turns out to 
be beneficial – by maximising profits best – they stick to it. If 
not, they adopt a new rule and depart from the old one. Thus 
we have to formulate the profit function of the optimist π(opt,t) 
and pessimist π(pes,t). The profit or loss function is defined as the 
price change (bt-b(t-1)) times the quantity D(i,t) for each type of 
trader, i.e. π(i,t)=D(i,t)*(bt-b(t-1) ). Following the literature by Brock 
and Hommes (1997), the fraction of optimists and pessimists 
is distributed according to
Global Financial Institute
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where Zt=exp(βπ(opt,t) )+exp(βπpes,t) and β>0 is a parameter 
measuring the intensity of choice. For β=0, traders are ran-
domly optimists or pessimists, which means a pure stochastic 
distribution of traders. For β→∞ all traders are either optimis-
tic (zt→1) or pessimistic (zt→0).
The simulation of this behavioural model illustrates two 
important insights: 
1) During booms or busts there is animal spirit, which means 
there are either more optimists or pessimists. This imbalance 
will cause the markets to overreact either positively or nega-
tively (Figure 6). 
2) If there is sufficient disagreement about the fundamental 
value (if there is a large x), we get multiple equilibria (Figure 7). 
Both phenomena are common in bond markets under tur-
moil. The following numerical simulation illustrates these 
points in detail. Figure 6 demonstrates the effect of animal 
spirit on bond markets. The dotted curve is the simulation of 
the rate of change in market data – that is, either price growth 
or price decline. However, in all periods of abnormal changes, 
either positive or negative, the market automatically experi-
ences animal spirit (solid curve). The black solid curve jumps 
between zero and one and indicates a typical regime switch.
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Figure 6: Market Data (dotted line) vs. Animal Spirit (solid line)
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During market exaggeration the solid curve jumps up or 
down. This jump phenomenon illustrates the amplification 
effect and is typical of herding behaviour. Thus, our simulation 
captures the last element of bond market turmoil in our con-
ceptual model. The bond market anomalies in Greece and Italy 
displayed exactly this feature during the European sovereign 
debt crisis.
The next Figure 7 is a simulation of the relationship between 
the bond price bt and the parameter x. A greater x, meaning a 
wider disagreement between optimists and pessimists about 
the fair bond value, results in multiple equilibria. Figure 7 indi-
cates an equilibrium space for numbers bigger than 5.5.
The lesson here is that animal spirit leads to large fluctuations 
and multiple equilibria even if the fundamental value has not 
been changed by any exogenous shock. However, notice that 
the trigger of animal spirit is either asymmetric information 
or weak reputation. Therefore, investors have to study these 
two issues in advance and in detail. In addition, they have to 
understand and know that in crises, markets suddenly experi-
ence animal spirit. In summary, our model explains the entire 
and sophisticated pricing dynamics of bond markets. Fortu-
nately, this model provides informed investors a certain equi-
librium price range.
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Figure 7: Bifurcation Diagram
Own simulation.
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In this white paper we develop a new bond market theory for 
euro area sovereign debt markets under stress. We find that 
bond markets are different in the euro area because of the 
institutional issues of the EMU. First, member countries have 
fiscal authority without monetary authority. Thus, eurozone 
member states cannot guarantee payment of bondholders 
in all cases. Second, a monetary union reduces the incentive 
to maintain sustainable finances despite the existence of the 
no-bailout clause and the Stability and Growth Pact. Conse-
quently, there is a disconnect between bond market funda-
mentals and the respective bond yield, which measures the 
default probability. We identify the trigger mechanism from 
normal pricing to turmoil by two factors: asymmetric infor-
mation and/or political reputation. Both issues trigger nega-
tive sentiments and change market expectations suddenly. 
Finally, these negative pricing effects are amplified by animal 
spirits, which lead to self-reinforcing bubbles and/or herding 
behaviour.
The model offers a reasonable explanation of the recent 
events during the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. We 
present the linkages with a graphical approach and analyse 
the pricing effects. We identified the key determinants that 
trigger the switch of bond markets to both crises mode and 
animal spirits. First, we find that three key variables, such as 
economic fundamentals, asymmetric information, and politi-
cal reputation determine the move of bond markets into 
market turmoil. In addition, we show that the occurrence of 
animal spirits and multiple equilibria rest on the relative num-
ber of optimists and pessimists as well as the disagreement 
in the fundamental value. Altogether the erosion of these fac-
tors triggers a sudden switch of the bond demand with severe 
negative effects on bond yields. Thus, the model provides use-
ful insight for all bond investors in times of bond market pan-
ics in the eurozone.
The policy lesson is simple: Countries that display bad or mul-
tiple equilibria have not only bad fundamentals, but they have 
an asymmetric information and/or overall reputation problem 
aligned with animal spirit. Only in this case does the market 
face turmoil and multiple equilibria. To tackle the root causes, 
governments have to restore confidence by implementing 
structural reforms, austerity measures, transparency, and 
strong commitments to sustainable policy in the future. At the 
same time, central banks have to provide liquidity provisions 
to mitigate a liquidity crisis and smooth the transition process 
towards the new equilibrium. However, countries that display 
a solvency problem should not get further support according 
to the Maastricht rules and economic wisdom – even in a mon-
etary union. Otherwise, we generate more moral hazard and 
even weaker disciplinary incentives that will further erode the 
EMU’s institutional framework. Consequently, it would be rea-
sonable to develop an efficient resolution scheme or exit strat-
egy for eurozone countries that display sustained economic 
or financial problems. The EMU without such a mechanism is 
exposed to the same risk that systemic financial institutions 
still pose to the financial system: “too big to fail.” The necessary 
institutional changes must be made before it is too late. In the 
absence of a resolution scheme, the next eurozone crisis is just 
a matter of time.
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Suppose there are two groups of traders: group one and group 
two. The utility is assumed to be a linear function where M is 
the consumption of goods other than bonds Bi. The quality zi 
denotes the quality of bonds i, and n is the number of bonds. 
The utility function yields
 
and 
Assume that both groups of traders maximise von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility functions. Moreover, group one 
holds n bonds with uniformly distributed quality vi, 0≤vi≤2, 
and group two holds none. Without loss of generality we 
assume that the price for other goods M is one. The income 
of all type one traders is Y1 and all type two traders Y2. This 
implies the following demand and supply functions:
and the supply S, for p≤2: S1 = z * n = (p/2)*n. Supply of groups 
is per definition zero S2=0. The demand is:
Consequently, total demand D(p,z) is:
However, in case of average quality, defined as z = p/2, there is 
no demand in any market condition. Thus, the market mecha-
nism – normal equilibrium, EN – breaks down under asymmet-
ric information.
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1  Other assumptions are risk-neutral agents or risk lovers.
2  The PRI is newly developed by Professor Herzog, the Director 
of the ‘Institute of Finance and Economics’ (IFE) at ESB Business 
School, Germany. Investors can ask the IFE Reutlingen for a PRI 
update and country specific evaluations of default risk.
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